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Abstract: The philosophical nature of elements of Irish writing has been often 
remarked upon; the peculiarity of this phenomenon less so. In this article, the 
relation between idealist philosophy and the politics of writing in the work of 
W.B. Yeats, Samuel Beckett and John Banville is explored. Obliquely discernible 
only within certain strands of modern Irish literature, a philosophical 
obsessiveness has nonetheless developed in a culture devoid of significant 
philosophical achievement. Thomas Duddy’s A History of Irish Thought is 
remarkable for making apparent the poverty of Irish philosophical traditions; 
the invisibility of philosophy in contemporary Irish cultural discourse is also 
notable by its absence in the recent Cambridge Companion to Modern Irish 
Culture, for example. Nevertheless, there exists a strong philosophically 
idealist tradition within Irish literature. This article traces that tradition within 
twentieth-century Irish writing, and examines how its ideological character 
may be considered as complicating the reception of Ireland in the work of these 
writers. 
To speak of an Irish philosophical tradition, as Thomas Duddy suggests in the 
preface to his 2006 A History of Irish Thought (xi-xii), is to immediately challenge 
conventional paradigms of modern European intellectual history. That there exists 
no such identifiable thing as a distinctively Irish tradition of systematic philosophical 
thought – as distinct from French, British or German philosophy – seems clear, because 
Ireland, given the economic, social and political vagaries of her history, was unable to 
support a developed intellectual culture over a sustained period of time. Yet, Duddy 
maintains, the idea should not be completely disbarred. There is a history of Irish thought, 
however historically disjointed, politically influenced and ethnically complex; features 
which themselves reflect the historicality of all thought, and the materiality of culture. 
The haphazard picture of Irish thought, Duddy says, is unique and peculiar, and must 
be analysed in terms of “the contingencies of history” (xiv). There is then, an accidental 
history of Irish thought: but efforts to find intellectual continuity are perilous, and tracing 
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the influence of what might be considered a “national” philosophy is prey not only to 
the fortunes of historical interpretation, but also to the more pressing problematics of 
the politics of cultural authenticity. Such difficulties are themselves an expression of 
the trauma of naming manifest modernity in Ireland; Duddy’s account accords with 
an embedded assumption of Irish history as one of fragmentation, discord and even 
backwardness in relation to an apparently more stable and progressive conception of 
European culture. This familiar dichotomy has been a marked feature of accounts of 
Irish culture, where it has found champions across many diverse fields and disciplines.
Yet in the twentieth century there emerged to various degrees in Irish literary 
modernism a recognizably philosophical character, one that is coloured by shades of 
idealist philosophies. With the oncoming decrepitude of his body it is predominantly 
Plato and Berkeley who feature in the work of the late WB Yeats; in James Joyce’s 
radiant streams of consciousness we find parallels with the setting forth of mental 
processes in Husserl’s phenomenological investigations. Samuel Beckett’s texts grapple 
with Descartes, Guelincx, and Schopenhauer, while in John Banville’s works, it is Kant, 
romantic idealism and various shades of existentialist thought which dominate. These 
influences have long been recognized, mostly as discreet phenomena, even as they 
have shaped the perception of these writers as sometime literary academicians. But 
such philosophical inflections, drawn from what is considered to be a wide European 
intellectual history, have also helped complicate the place of this strand of Irish literary 
production within a broader description of modernism. 
Much of the first sustained criticism of Banville, for example, was concerned with 
distancing the writer from the Irish context altogether, because his work was sensitive 
to what Rüdiger Imhof (7) called “incontestably non-Irish subject matter.” Symptomatic 
of the politico-literary ideology of 1970s and 80s, many of the earlier debates about 
Banville’s “contexts” expended considerable amounts of energy during a degrading war 
between what was to be properly called Irish “national” literature or European modernism. 
Focusing primarily on superficial markers such as content and style, Irish writers found 
themselves caught in the crossfire between a number of corrosive theoretically binarist 
models based on stages of development, such as modern/traditional, experimentalist/
naturalist, and most poisonous of all, Irish/European; Irish writing could be one or the 
other, but not both. 
From our slightly later perspective, it is apparent that much of those debates were 
fuelled by both a suspicion of supposedly nationalist ideology and by underdeveloped 
critiques of modernism both inside and outside of Ireland. Considering the distressing 
birth of the Irish state, the conservative forces that kept it in check throughout much of the 
twentieth century, the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and a routinely ailing 
economy, much of the ambivalence towards Ireland and “Irish identity” expressed by both 
critics and writers is comprehensible.1 Yet there persisted among theorists of modernism, 
for longer than was helpful, a repudiation that Irish writers such as Joyce and Beckett 
were not properly Irish writers by virtue of their commitment to European cosmopolitan 
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and modernist plurality and hence their escape from historical determinism and political 
motivation.2 These well-worn arguments are themselves historically instructive; they 
have taken their place in the history of criticism and become a genealogical branch of 
Irish cultural disputation. Considering the disrepute that the stadial explanations of 
modernity upon which they so depended have now fallen into, the more immediate 
concern here is to provide instead a more nuanced understanding of the ideological, 
cultural and aesthetic significance of Irish philosophical literature. 
Trying to locate Irish philosophical precursors to writers like Yeats, Joyce, 
Beckett and Banville is not immediately useful or necessary in any holistic sense, but 
tracing the ideological character of idealist philosophy in Irish writing reveals forms of 
aesthetic consciousness that may be constructive for critiques of modernity and Ireland. 
This is not to suggest that we are dealing with a robust tradition, but, instead, one with 
a faint pulse. What cannot be initially disputed is that philosophy in Ireland is a much 
undervalued discipline that has been treated with a considerable amount of indifference 
in Irish intellectual life. Beyond the various economic, political and social calamities 
that befell Ireland throughout much of her modern history, there are, naturally, other 
significant historical reasons related to the provision of education as to why philosophy 
remains an underdeveloped field in Ireland. The lack of a University in the Middle Ages 
when many other European countries had established important centres of learning is 
significant, and when Trinity College was later founded it catered only for a minority 
and remained largely inaccessible to much of the population. There has admittedly been 
a scholastic tradition in Catholic teaching through the seminaries that exists to this day, 
but only since the 1960s has the scope of philosophy in Irish universities been opened up 
to take in critical forms of thought that had already changed the landscape of Continental 
philosophy many decades before.3 Despite many well known academic philosophers, 
such as Richard Kearney, who are widely published and internationally respected, 
Ireland’s contribution to real philosophical innovation has been minimal. However, 
because we are talking in principle about an absence of specific modes of thought here, 
the effect this dearth of philosophy has had on the history of Irish intellectual life is 
entirely unquantifiable and in the realm of hypothesis. Consequently, it is vital not to 
relapse into a model of relative development in accounting for the presence or absence 
of Irish philosophy in modernity: what is called for is a more complex understanding of 
Irish philosophical literature situated within the disparate realm of European modernity. 
However, the ignoring of repeated calls for the inclusion of philosophy as part of the 
secondary school curriculum, most recently by Professor Michael Cronin of DCU in The 
Irish Times, bears further testament to the fact that there exists no appreciative culture 
of the value of philosophy in Irish public life (15). That successive Irish governments 
have disregarded these calls illustrates that the future for philosophy as an intellectual 
discipline in Ireland is bleak, even as further European integration gathers speed. 
For all that, Ireland has by no means hitherto remained untouched by the col-
lective philosophical achievements of its neighbours. Instead, whatever philosophical 
tradition in Ireland that has evolved has found expression, not in what would be commonly 
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understood as philosophical discourse, but in literature instead. During the Revival, for 
example, we see a variety of philosophically-inflected literature emerging. Considering 
that Irish modernism played its part in the much wider continental affair, this is perhaps not 
such an unusual occurrence, however limited and disorderly these philosophical engage-
ments were. To take two obvious examples: Yeats was as widely read in the contemporary 
British analytical philosophy of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell as he was in Nietzsche. 
Joyce, as Timothy Mooney argues on the other hand, for all his classical references and 
knowledge of medieval aesthetics, demonstrates little actual understanding of modern an 
contemporary philosophy. In this sense, Joyce is discernibly less deliberately philosophi-
cally engaged than a writer such as J. M. Synge, for example, in whose work can be found 
a prefiguring of the Beckettian crisis of existence. Nevertheless, we can find performance 
in his work of Husserlian phenomenology in the stream of consciousness technique, and 
a “proximity” to Nieztschean historicism (Mooney 185).4 These observations bring their 
own cultural politics where a view might be bolstered that philosophical sophistication 
elevates Irish modernists beyond their immediate locality. But to prove mathematically 
that the communion of abstract ideas within a shared historical era constitutes a supra-
national movement is hazardous; for the influence of philosophy in Irish writing is still 
primarily a matter of cultural production, and whatever philosophical tradition exists in 
Irish literature, it is primarily of the idealist/neo-platonic variety. 
The first most striking adherent of idealism in modern Irish literature was Yeats. 
While developing his extraordinary work, A Vision, the poet corresponded throughout 
1926 with G. E. Moore’s brother, Sturge, about G. E.’s influential refutation of Yeats’ 
fellow Irishman George Berkeley’s idealism. Idealism had come under attack by the 
leading Cambridge analytical philosophers, Russell and Moore in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, both of whom were instrumental in developing a philosophy of 
logical analysis of language and reality based on mathematical precision. Yeats, whose 
early romanticism never quite burned out, regarded such positivism not only with an 
aesthete’s distaste of brute fact, but also with an intellectual scepticism. He had become 
increasingly interested in philosophy in his later career, and devoted much of his study 
to Berkeley, whose immaterialist doctrines increasingly appealed to him. During the 
course of the letters to Sturge Moore, Yeats complains that realist philosophers vulgarize 
the world, turning the mind into the “quicksilver at the back of a mirror” (Yeats & 
Moore 67) where perception, which occurs as a mental process, is rendered a pointless 
duplication of phenomena. 
Yeats states that G. E. Moore’s attack on Berkeley was “extraordinarily obscure” 
(Ibid. 83), and the correspondence itself is not entirely philosophically rigorous. There 
appears, according to Grosvenor E. Powell (279-280), something of a misunderstanding 
on Yeats’s behalf of the precise nature of G. E. Moore’s argument, while, Sturge 
also seems to misinterpret Yeats’s own meaning of existence. Nonetheless, Yeats’s 
correspondence with Sturge was primarily of a philosophical character, and one in which 
he was compelled to make explicit his agreement with Berkeley’s most famous axiom – 
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esse est percepi (to be is to be perceived) – that the material world does not exist without 
perception. Although Yeats’s poetry underwent a significant stylistic and structural 
evolution over the course of his life, immaterialism can be found right throughout his 
work and is in part derived from his romantic and theosophical leanings.
Philosophically, Yeats found affinity with Berkeley, and found in his work an 
idea of the supreme intellect that gave form to the perceptible world. Berkeley’s targets, 
Newton and Locke, had conceived of matter as part of a mechanistic system that rendered 
it inert and senseless. This was problematic for Berkeley because the material universe 
would be lifeless and without agency, a potential cause, as he saw it, of atheism. While 
there are undoubted religious motivations in play in Berkeley’s thinking, it was at the same 
time philosophically important for Yeats that he prioritized mental activity over material 
substance. Chief among his ideas, common to all idealist thought, is a greater Absolute 
reality than is ordinarily perceptible, a more “authentic” existence. Berkeley’s universe 
is one in which being and consciousness are one and the same thing – a profound Unity 
of existence which is vital and innate rather than mechanistic as Locke, Newton and 
the followers of Descartes would have seen it. Yeats, too, was unwilling to conceive of 
an ultimate form of reality that did not have consciousness as its ground zero, claiming 
that “in so far as Time and Space are deduced from our sense-data we are the creators 
of Time and Space” (Yeats & Moore 82). 
This Berkelian idealism finds its way into much of Yeats’s later poetry and into 
the arcane, geometric universe of A Vision. But, as we know, Yeats’s interest in Berkeley 
was not confined to the abstract. There is an important cultural element to his attraction 
to Berkeley. When he was younger, he had considered Berkeley, along with Jonathan 
Swift, not sufficiently Irish to be included on a list of great Irish figures; but later in his 
life he heroized them, along with Goldsmith and Burke, most famously in his poem 
“Blood and the Moon”:
I declare this tower is my symbol; I declare
This winding, gyring, spiring treadmill of a stair is my
 ancestral stair;
That Goldsmith and the Dean, Berkeley and Burke have
 travelled there. (Yeats 287)
His idealisation of these figures as the founders and epitome of the values of the 
eighteenth century Anglo-Irish meant that his interest could not be purely philosophical. 
Yeats would identify these four figures as central to an Irish Augustan tradition – a 
tradition that he placed himself firmly within – and the ideal image of Ireland that might 
emerge after the foundation of the State in 1922. 
Of these four Augustan Irishmen, Berkeley represented a great intellectual ideal. 
While the pure metaphysics of immaterialism seems to be an antidote to the earthy 
materialism of nationalism, Yeats considered otherwise. For Yeats, Berkeley’s idealism 
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was not merely philosophical; it was also an inherently Irish consciousness. In 1930, 
Yeats contributed an introduction to Joseph Hone’s and Mario Rossi’s biography of 
Berkeley, where he wrote that those four idealised Augustan Irishmen “found in England 
the opposite that made their thought lucid or stung it into expression” (vi). Yeats refers 
enthusiastically in his introduction to Berkeley’s retort that “we Irish” cannot think like 
the English empiricist John Locke, a repetition of a speech given in 1925 to the Irish 
Literary Society in which Yeats praised Berkeley in particular for his antagonism to 
British empiricism and the emphasis he laid on the primacy of the constitutive mind. 
He claimed: 
The modern Irish intellect was born more than two hundred years ago when 
Berkeley defined in three or four sentences the mechanical philosophy of 
Newton, Locke and Hobbes, the philosophy of England in his day, and I think 
of England up to our day, and wrote after each: “We Irish do not hold with this”, 
or some such sentence. (Pearce 172) 
Consequently, Yeats’s correspondence has the subtext of cultural and national 
protectiveness, and more importantly, the establishment of a culturally-specific kind of 
Irish identity revealed through opposition to the British mind. Berkeley was, as Yeats 
said, a figure “of the utmost importance” to Protestant Ireland in the new Irish Free 
State, an embodiment of the highest values of the eighteenth century Anglo Irish, an 
era which grew in Yeats’s mind, as Roy Foster says, as a society which valued “style, 
intellect and aristocratic authority, an attitude reflected in literature, philosophy and 
architecture” (409; 426).
There is a good deal of creative invention of tradition on Yeats’ behalf here, 
not least in his own eccentric sense of aristocratic destiny. As with most idealist artists, 
history is a servant of the mind: Yeats’ revision of the Anglo-Irish tradition asserts the 
domination of the imagination over life. But there is an influential political ideology 
at work here too. In his admiration of Berkeley, we see in Yeats the association of a 
high-born colonial class culture with a philosophy that emphasises the importance of 
the subjective world as characteristically (Anglo) Irish. This fundamentally romantic 
ideology has influenced much of the working subject matter in Irish cultural production, 
where such historical romanticization of tradition has been a familiar experience and a 
highly contentious one. In much of the Irish writing that followed Yeats in the twentieth 
century, those works with similar idealist impulses have enacted a volatile relationship 
with the ideologies of cultural authenticity and the myths of the revival; this is the case 
in the works of Samuel Beckett and John Banville, for example. And if it is true that 
the fragmentary nature of philosophy in Ireland betrays the machinations of its own 
historical formation, then the literary forms that philosophy has taken carry traces of 
the political residue of its manipulation. 
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Leaving aside for the present the difficult question of the relation between a 
philosophical system and its representation or expression in literary form, the connection 
between philosophical idealism and cultural identification within certain strands of Irish 
literature reveals a fundamental concern with what is cryptically called in metaphysics the 
“Unity of Being”, or what might be alternatively termed “authentic” identity. In the work 
of Samuel Beckett, this ontological concern is pursued with carnivorous ruthlessness. 
In Beckett’s classic trilogy of novels written between 1947 and 1950, Molloy, Malone 
Dies and the Unnamable, for instance, the narrative – if it can be called that – broadly 
takes the form of the gradual degeneration of the body, a movement which represents the 
withdrawal from the physical world into the prison of pure consciousness. From Mol-
loy, who can walk but eventually must crawl, to Malone, who is bedridden and dying, 
then to the Unnamable, who is merely a torso and head in a jar, the decline of the body 
serves as an image of the eradication of the world, the withdrawal into idealism, the 
slow descent towards solipsism and the determination to carry on until a core identity 
is found. As the narrators’ bodies disintegrate and the activities of the mind become the 
focus of the narrative, Beckett’s trilogy dramatizes the relentless torture of pure mental 
imprisonment. It can be argued here that there is a kind of perverse idealist impulse at 
work here in which the reality of the mind hellishly supersedes that of the body: the 
narrator attempts to come ever closer to his “authentic” identity by stripping away the 
external, material world, and in the process becoming ever more solipsistic. For this 
reason, Beckett has been described as a Cartesian. Language too plays its part in this 
game: the ultimate goal for the Unnamable is to fall into silence, through which he will 
become pure identity. But of course, as the Unnamable famously asserts, he must “go 
on” – the indestructible core of “authentic” identity cannot be ultimately found: he is, 
as the Unnamable asserts, always “at the threshold” of the door (418). 
What is at stake here is the idea of what John Banville’s narrators frequently 
identify as “pure mind” or “pure form” – Beckett’s narrators are ultimately unable to find 
this essentiality. Ironically, this failure saves Beckett’s works from being the mouthpieces 
of doctrinal philosophy by preventing these heroic narrators from slipping completely 
into the realm of the abstract. Perhaps no philosophical text could live with such explicit 
failure, making modern literature the ideal medium for the expression of ignorance. For 
an idealist such as Kant, the transcendental ego existed prior to psychical phenomena; 
later, Husserl’s attempt to make the social world the site of all conscious acts would 
veer dangerously close to a transcendental solipsism. Beckett’s writing, emboldened 
through its literary form, ultimately disallows the fundamental ground of truth that 
idealist philosophy seeks. Least of all that is accepted in Beckett would appear to be 
Berkeley’s immaterialist doctrine. Consonantly, arguments have been made for Beckett 
as a materialist. Terry Eagleton (2006), for example, has argued that suffering in Beckett 
is surely physical not mental; the body dictates the condition of the mind. Hence, when 
in Waiting for Godot Lucky states: “since the death of Bishop Berkeley…in a word for 
reasons unknown no matter what matter the facts are there” (43), David Berman takes 
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this insistence on fact to be a “dismissal of Berkeley’s idealism” (43). But we might also 
add that this is Lucky’s speech and not Beckett’s; while it is the case that Berkeley’s 
immaterialism is potentially refuted in Beckett, the philosophical force of much his work 
is driven by an idealist fascination with an undiscoverable, yet potentially tangible ego. 
Ultimately, while the narratives in these texts are too unstable for any decisive dogmatic 
assertion, there is sufficient anxiety in Beckett’s texts to dismiss completely the possibility 
of an idealist core: his favourite word was, after all, perhaps. 
Beckett’s inconclusive skirmish with idealism is significant in another sense, 
for the question of the relation between aesthetic representation of a philosophical idea 
and philosophy itself persists. Despite being steeped in philosophical reading, Beckett 
himself protested against the discipline’s language of ratiocination and rejected readings 
of his work presented in philosophical terms. This seems a curious paradox; for of all 
Irish writers, Beckett appears the most overtly philosophical, and superficially at least, 
a natural inheritor of the concerns behind Berkeley’s immaterialism. What makes these 
considerations of idealism in Beckett seem purely philosophical is the lack of specificity 
of place: the empty landscapes in his texts appear to remove cultural nuance from philo-
sophical speculation. Unlike Yeats, Beckett’s treatment of the Irish philosopher seems 
unrelated to national politics. Yet this is not to state that there is no political dimension 
to Beckett’s treatment of philosophy. In postcolonial treatments of Beckett, for example, 
both David Lloyd (1993. 41-58) and Anna McMullan (89-109) have argued that the 
repudiation of definitive narrative in Beckett’s work is a disentitlement of the structures 
of political power that legitimized colonialism, for example. Beckett’s work is neither 
an overtly political or philosophical literature, but through the rejection of narrative 
to legitimize itself, the structures of knowledge which bolstered cultural and political 
authenticity are disentitled. If Yeats had thought Berkeley’s philosophical idealism a 
unique example of the Irish mind, the authenticity of that claim comes under pressure 
in Beckett because the positive identity of that mind remains elusive. So it is that David 
Lloyd (2010. 38) has recently suggested that Beckett’s “relentless deconstruction of the 
very terms of representation … presents an absolute difficulty for cultural studies of any 
kind”; Beckett’s work is a powerful riposte to the ideology of Irish cultural authenticity 
in philosophical impulses inherent in Yeats. 
It was suggested at the outset of this article that whatever philosophical tradi-
tion in Ireland exists has found expression, not in philosophical discourse, but instead in 
literature. The obvious objection to this statement is that a philosophical literature can 
be considered a distinct phenomenon in itself rather than the superimposition onto, or 
engagement of one mode of expression with another. On the other hand, as Duddy would 
imply, philosophy in Ireland has developed in typically unrecognizable forms. Beckett 
sought to distinguish his art from the discipline of philosophy, but in the work of John 
Banville they are not necessarily separate forms of thought; Banville’s early work in 
particular is itself an idealist philosophy of art that at its most intense is revealed through 
its form. For example, in the Big House novel, Birchwood, which repeatedly likens itself 
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to the Kantian “thing in itself”, and again in novels such as Kepler and Mefisto, and to a 
more obscure extent, Ghosts, it is the form, and not the content, which strives to manifest 
itself as a purely literary entity. Taking as their starting point the Beckettian assertion 
that to be an artist is to fail, these novels attempt to show that any effort by the mind 
to order reality merely ends in failure. A succession of narrators, from scientists to art 
critics, and ultimately to the Gods themselves, discover that their “ordering systems” – 
Banville’s shorthand for the artistic project – are fraudulent or incomplete, an obvious 
critique, it would seem, of the Yeatsian claims of idealism to order time and space as the 
supreme reality, and one that aligns Banville close to Beckett. What we see in Banville 
is the supreme paradox of the assertion that all art ends in failure, but that the best art 
depends on a form which successfully demonstrates that failure. This works to greater 
or lesser degrees in his work, but this explicit tension, which must remain unresolved in 
his work, obscures the fact that Banville’s early formalism most certainly posited art as 
a supreme reality at the same time as those narratives superficially suggested otherwise. 
Ostensibly, Banville’s work seems to be philosophically aware in so far as his 
narrators all share an introverted world-view that owes much to the idealist frameworks 
they draw from and which Banville himself is well versed in. At the same time, Beckett’s 
anti-rationalist ghost is ever present in Banville’s writing. Banville has also been attentive 
to Yeats, most significantly in his Big House novella, The Newton Letter. In that novella, 
Banville’s most political piece of all, the ideology of authenticity is lent a distinctly 
contemporary Irish air by linking the origin of a community with a romanticized history. 
The parallels with Yeats’s idealisation of Berkeley and Yeats veneration of the Augustan 
tradition are striking. The narrator, a failed historian, regards whom he mistakenly believes 
to be an aristocratic Anglo-Irish family as a “spectacle of pure refinement” (Banville 
516). But when the family turns out to be Catholics, whose friends are sympathizers of 
the IRA, the narrator is shocked into rethinking his preconceptions. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s when the book was written and published, romanticized history was seen as 
contributing to political violence on either side of the sectarian divide. Seamus Deane 
links the romanticization of history with two distinct historical figures, each revered as 
embodiments of their traditions, by claiming that 
Yeats was indeed our last romantic as was Pearse in politics. They were men 
who asserted a coincidence between the destiny of the community and their 
own and believed that this coincidence had historical repercussion. (Deane 
2003. 20) 
Deane’s analysis of Yeats and Pearse as figures who aspired to both restore 
the origins and shape the destiny of their community is very close to the Heideggerian 
sense of the authentic, who, according to one critic, believed that “the resolute people 
discloses and acts on its destiny just as the resolute individual discloses and acts on his 
fate” (Zimmerman 173). The fate of the cultural politics of a nation lies in the hands of 
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individuals who resolutely embrace their history and transform it into an ideal. Pearse’s 
violent nationalism is treated with grave suspicion in The Newton Letter; and what 
Banville sees in the Yeatsian ideal is the dangerous connections between authenticity and 
nationalism. In art, philosophy and politics, Yeats remains a figure indelibly associated 
with the pursuit of authenticity, attempting to seemingly embody and generate the origin 
and destiny of his tradition. With its references to Yeatsian landscapes and Big House 
grandeur, The Newton Letter plays on the romanticization of the Big House by depicting 
the integration of Anglo-Irish culture and aesthetics as an idealised form. 
But here we are only thinking about the ironic potential in the content of 
Banville’s work. What is perhaps of greater importance is the extent to which Banville’s 
insistence that art should remain separate from politics is itself a political stance linked 
to an idealisation of art as a pure form. He has repeatedly asserted that politics and art 
are unwelcome bedfellows, and should avoid each other. “All one wants to do”, he 
told Belinda McKeon (14), “is to make a small, finished, polished, burnished, beautiful 
object.” While a work such as The Newton Letter demonstrates that there is no art that 
does not contain traces of the historical moment that produces it – “real life seeps in” as 
Banville says – the overwhelming feeling is of nostalgia and longing for a more perfect 
world, an Eden where the artist-God who controlled time and space had the ultimate 
power of individual creation; like a diminished version of Berkeley’s God, Banville’s 
ideal author brings his creatures into existence, moved by the agency of imagination 
alone. In this sense, Banville’s skeptical treatment of the politics of Yeats’ romanticizing 
of his Anglo-Irish forbears is a self-criticism, for he too is aware of his guilt in making 
the historical world a vassal of the absolute reality of the mind. 
Berkeley could not accept a world of passive inanimate material; Banville’s 
aesthetics entail the forlorn resurrection of that philosophy in literary form, particularly 
in novels such Birchwood, The Science Tetralogy, Mefisto, Ghosts and the duology of 
Eclipse and Shroud. These novels come closest to the exhibition of Banville’s ideal of a 
totalized, unified, unspoiled “pure” form. While Banville’s novels suggest themselves 
to be a progressive variation of Beckett, ultimately his work restores art as an ideal 
of itself, a discrete entity where the aestheticization of reality entails the domination 
of a pure art over the uncontrollability of life. In formal terms, Banville’s is perhaps 
the clearest expression of an Irish philosophy in that regard; in Irish historico-cultural 
terms the yearning for some form of unity has in Banville’s work, what has been termed 
“psychiatric accuracy” (Deane 1975. 337). The political character of Banville’s writing 
has a distinct lineage to the Yeatsian synthesis of art and the man: in Banville both political 
ideology and art have the potential to see themselves as the incarnation of pure, authentic 
identity, which is why works such as The Untouchable and Shroud, for example, take 
political figures and events as their subject material. In this, Banville’s aesthetics fall 
under the same pathos of authenticity that is at the heart of all idealist thought, and is 
a contemporary re-enactment of the extraordinary anxiety about ontological status that 
lay at the dynamic heart of Irish modernism. Yet Banville’s work is curious in that for 
81
all its innovation in the purest formal dramatization of philosophy in Irish writing, it 
is at the same time ideologically conservative in its persistent idealist nostalgia, while 
also, despite his claims, politically attuned, attentive to the denigrated status of art in 
contemporary culture. 
Notes
1 In his earlier years Banville routinely dissociated himself from the category of “Irish” writing. 
He has described Ireland as “a demilitarised and totalitarian state in which the lives of the 
citizens were to be controlled not by a system of coercive force and secret policing, but by a 
kind of applied spiritual paralysis maintained by an unofficial federation between the Catholic 
clergy, the Judiciary and the civil service.” John Banville, “Memory and Forgetting: The Ireland 
of de Valera and O’Faoláin”, in Dermot Keogh, Carmel Quinlan and Finbarr O’Shea, eds, 
Ireland in the 1950s: The Lost Decade (Cork: Mercier Press, 2004. 26). 
2 Aided in no small part by those writers themselves, who all repeatedly rejected the nationalisation 
of their work.
3 The scholastic tradition is still healthy in many Irish colleges. To take an example: scholastic 
philosophy, a major part of the curriculum of Ireland’s main seminary, St Patrick’s College, 
Maynooth, also dominates the curriculum of its sister institution, NUI Maynooth, where more 
scholastic than continental or analytic philosophy continues to be taught to its humanities 
students.
4 It is ironic in this regard that Yeats could be seen as more “modern” than Joyce. Indeed, Yeats 
himself recorded after an early discussion with the younger man that Joyce naively believed 
that “everything has been settled by Thomas Aquinas”, a view that Yeats was dismissive of and 
which betrays something of the relative slightness of Joyce’s Jesuit education. “I have met so 
many like him”, Yeats said about Joyce’s youthful attraction to Aquinas. Quoted by Richard 
Ellman, “Joyce and Yeats”, The Kenyon Review 12. 4 (Autumn, 1950): 625.
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